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Introduction
Orange County's bankruptcy was an historical event. Municipal
bankruptcies are rare, and Orange County's was the largest case ever.
At the time of its bankruptcy, the County was the fifth most populous
county in the United States, with two and a half million residents.
The County's budget exceeded $3.7 billion, and its employees
numbered about 18,000.1 Even among large municipal bankruptcies,
the case was unique. Large cases typically involve declining urban
centers, short on tax revenues and long on spending commitments.
Orange County, by contrast, was a prosperous suburban county, and
its financial demise was triggered by a risky investment strategy gone
bad. The County treasurer oversaw a leveraged investment pool that
had lost $1.6 billion by the time of its bankruptcy filing.2 In addition,
the County's financial distress had direct consequences for many
other local government entities. The County invested not only its
1. See MARK BALDASSARE, WHEN GOVERNMENT FAILs: THE ORANGE COUNTY

BANKRUPTCY 7 (1998).
2. See id. Of the $20 billion in investments, $13 billion was made with borrowed

money. See id. at 90.
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own money, but funds of other municipal entities within Orange
County 3 -including cities, school districts, sanitation and water
The
districts, and the County's employee retirement system.4
County's investment woes therefore placed many other municipal
entities and their constituencies at risk.
In addition to its financial ripple effects, the Orange County case
implicated novel legal issues. One such issue concerns the eligibility
of municipal entities to file for bankruptcy, a question that is
determined by a mix of federal and state law. In particular, federal
law requires specific state authorization in order for a municipality to
file. Federal bankruptcy law offers a chapter specifically designed for
municipalities in financial distress. However, because of federal
Constitutional concerns, a municipal entity may resort to bankruptcy
only with the authorization of its state.
This federal requirement of state authorization derives from the
Constitutional principle that the federal government may not
interfere with states' internal governance. Federal law must respect
states' sovereignty over their political subdivisions. So while federal
law offers a municipal bankruptcy process, the state authorization
requirement leaves to each state the final say over whether and which
of its political subdivisions may have access to this process. Together
with certain Bankruptcy Code provisions,5 each state's authorization
statute sets the conditions under which its municipal entities will be
eligible for federal bankruptcy. This Article focuses on California's
authorization provision.
The states have taken varying approaches in managing their
municipalities' access to bankruptcy. Some states provide blanket
authorization, in effect pre-approving resort to bankruptcy for their
municipal entities without qualifications or conditions.6 At least one
state flatly prohibits municipal bankruptcy filings. 7 Some states
impose preconditions to filing-for example, prior approval of state
officials for the bankruptcy filing or the plan of adjustment, or state

3. See infra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
4. See BALDASSARE, supra note 1, at 95.
5. See infra Part II[C].
6. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. § 35-603 (2001); TEX. LOc. GOV'T CODE § 140.001
(2002). One commentator notes that fourteen states have enacted such blanket
authorization statutes. See Daniel J. Freyberg, Note, Municipal Bankruptcy and Express
State Authorization to be a Chapter 9 Debtor: Current State Approaches to Municipal
Insolvency-and What Will States Do Now?, 23 OHio N.U. L. REv. 1001,1008 n.66 (1997).
A simple count of authorization statutes by itself, however, may oversimplify. See infra
note 125 and accompanying text.
7. See GA. CODE ANN. § 36-80-5 (2001). Iowa allows a municipal filing only when
the municipality has been rendered insolvent as a result of a debt involuntarily incurred.
See IOWA CODE §§ 76.16, 76.16A (2002).
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appointment of a trustee." Many states have no statute on municipal
bankruptcy at all.'
The existing California law provides fairly broad authorization.
However, the current statute needs both technical and substantive
revision. Enacted in 1949, the statute is obsolete insofar as it
references a federal bankruptcy statute that has been superseded.
More importantly, as a substantive matter, the broad authorization
may be inappropriate. Given the sheer number and various different
types of municipal entities that now exist in California-from
irrigation districts to investment pools-as well as modem methods of
municipal finance, broad and indiscriminate access to municipal
bankruptcy is inadvisable. This Article proposes a reform of
California's authorizing statute for municipal bankruptcy filings.
Having surveyed other states' approaches,"0 and having reviewed
recent municipal financial crises-including that of Orange CountyI ultimately recommend a system of discretionary access, in which the
governor holds discretionary power to approve, disapprove, or
condition a municipality's access to bankruptcy. This Article is
organized as follows. Parts I and II provide background.' Part I
describes the general issue of state authorization and the interaction
of state and federal law that is required to satisfy federal
Constitutional concerns. Part II describes municipal bankruptcy,
highlighting its salient features. In Part III, I discuss the broad factors
that should be considered in designing a system of state authorization,
and I attempt to weigh those various factors in formulating a
recommendation. In Part IV, I discuss the range of possible
approaches, I describe my proposal, and I discuss the politics of
legislating such a proposal. Part V addresses specific questions
concerning the scope of the definition of "municipality" under the
Bankruptcy Code. 2
I. State Authorization and Federal Constitutional Concerns
The basic purpose for federal municipal bankruptcy lawChapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code' 3 -is the same as for private
corporations reorganizing under Chapter 11: to allow the debtor a
breathing spell from creditors' collection efforts and to enable it to
8. See infra Part IV.
9. See Freyberg, supra note 6, at 1009 and n.70.
10. This Article does not address state constitutional issues.
11. Readers familiar with federal municipal bankruptcy law and the general problem
of state authorization may wish to skip directly to Part IV.
12. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). This statute is hereafter referred to
as the "Bankruptcy Code." Unless otherwise specified, all statutory references herein
shall be to the current version of the Bankruptcy Code.
13. 11 U.S.C. §§ 901 et seq. (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
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formulate a repayment plan with creditors. 4 However, because
municipalities and private corporations are quite different creatures,
and because of Constitutional constraints that are implicated with
municipal bankruptcy, Chapter 9 operates very differently from
Chapter 11. In particular, a municipality may resort to bankruptcy
only with the specific authorization of its state, but once in
bankruptcy, the municipal debtor is subject to many fewer constraints
than its private corporate counterpart, both in terms of operations
and in formulating and achieving court approval of a repayment plan.
A. Federal Constitutional Concerns

Federal municipal bankruptcy law must tread a careful line.
Federal bankruptcy law provides a municipal debtor with the power
to bind a creditor to a plan of adjustment without its consent. While
granting this power, bankruptcy law must at the same time respect the
states' sovereign powers over their municipal entities. Therefore,
bankruptcy law and bankruptcy courts cannot interfere with the
governance or management of a municipal debtor. Understanding
this balancing act helps to explain the role of state authorization in
the federal scheme.
"to establish uniform Laws
The Constitution empowers Congress
• ,,15
The imprimatur of federal
on the subject of Bankruptcies.
bankruptcy law is critical to enabling a municipal debtor to bind its
creditors to a plan of adjustment because the Constitution specifically
reserves to Congress the power to impair contracts, and specifically
prohibits to the states. 6 "Only federal law can give the type of relief
afforded by chapter 9.""
14. See In re Addison Community Hosp. Auth., 175 B.R. 646, 649 (Bankr. E.D. Mich.
1994).
15. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 4.

16. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 10. cl. 1. This Constitutional provision has been held not to
create an absolute prohibition against state laws modifying contractual obligations in some
exigent circumstances. See Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park, N.J., 316
U.S. 502 (1942); Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1933); Ropico, Inc.
v. City of New York, 425 F.Supp. 970 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). However, section 903 of the
Bankruptcy Code was enacted specifically to preempt state bankruptcy laws. It provides
in part: "[A] state law prescribing a method of composition of indebtedness of [its]
municipality may not bind any creditor that does not consent to such composition." 11
U.S.C. § 903(1) (1994). The legislative history explains:
State adjustment acts have been held to be valid, but a bankruptcy law under
which the bondholders of a municipality are required to surrender or cancel their
obligations should be uniform throughout the States, as the bonds of almost
every municipality are widely held. Only under a Federal law should a creditor
be found to accept such an adjustment without his consent.
H.R. Rep. No. 2246, 79"' Cong. 2d. Sess. 4 (1946). The provision was passed in order to
overturn the Supreme Court's decision in Faitoute, 316 U.S. 502, which upheld a New
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Chapter 9 in effect authorizes municipalities in financial distress
to employ the federal power to impair contracts for the purpose of
effecting municipal debt adjustments. At the same time, however,
federal law must respect the sovereign powers guarantied to the states
by the Tenth Amendment. "The powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are
reserved to the states respectively, or to the people."' 8 Central to
states' sovereignty is their power to govern the affairs of their
municipalities. Therefore, federal law and federal bankruptcy courts
cannot attempt to intervene directly in municipal management or
operations, a sphere that falls squarely within the province of the
respective states.
B. The Federal Requirement of State Authorization
The current Chapter 9 is the result of a history of Constitutional
and Congressional debate over the proper allocation of power with
respect to municipal debt adjustment. Section 109(c)(2), requiring
specific state authorization for municipal bankruptcy filings, is a
product of this debate. It "has roots in the constitutional principle
that the federal government may not interfere with the internal
governance of a state or its political subdivisions."'1 9 A municipality
may resort to federal bankruptcy law only with proper authorization
from the state.
The current version of Section 109(c)(2) was passed as part of
the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994.20 It requires specific state
authorization for a municipality to file for bankruptcy. In order for a
municipality to be eligible for Chapter 9, it must be
specifically authorized, in its capacity as a municipality or by name,
to be a debtor under such chapter by State law, or by a
governmental officer or organization empowered by State law to
authorize such entity to be a debtor under such chapter.2'
Prior to 1994, only general state authorization was required.'
This general authorization provision basically reiterated the
analogous provision from the bankruptcy statute that preceded the
current Bankruptcy Code. Section 84 of the Bankruptcy Act stated
Jersey statute authorizing state adjustment plans for insolvent municipalities to bind
creditors without their consent.
17. In re City of Bridgeport, 128 B.R. 688, 694 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1991) (citing U. S. v.
Bekins, 304 U.S. 27 (1938)).

18. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
19. Michael W. McConnell & Randal C. Picker, When Cities Go Broke: A Conceptual
Introductionto MunicipalBankruptcy, 60 U. CHI.L. REv. 425,457 (1993).
20. Pub. L. No. 103-394,108 Stat. 4106 (1994).

21. 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(2) (1994).
22. See 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(2) (1988) (repealed 1994).
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that "[a]ny State's political subdivision... which is generally
authorized to file a petition under this chapter by the legislature... is
eligible for relief." 23
Courts construing this general authorization requirement
reached inconsistent results. Some construed it quite liberally,
finding that it "should be broadly construed to provide municipalities
maximum access to Chapter 9 within the constitutional limitations of
the Tenth Amendment."24 For example, one court held that general
authority was inferred from a municipality's authority to sue and be
sued, to incur debts, and to negotiate contracts that create obligations
and debts.' Other courts were more restrained in finding general

authority, refusing to infer authority from a general grant of powers.
For instance, the authority of a transit district to sue and be sued was
deemed by one court to be insufficient to infer authority to file
bankruptcy.2
Congress responded to the confusion by amending Section
109(c)(2) to require specific state authorization.
C.

California's Authorization Statute: Government Code Section 53760

Government Code Section 53760 is California's current general
statute authorizing municipal bankruptcy filings. It provides:

23. Act of April 8, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-260 (codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 401-418 (Supp.
1976)).
24. In re Sullivan County Regional Refuse Disposal Dist., 165 B.R. 60, 73 (Bankr.
D.N.H. 1994).
25. See In re Villages at Castle Rock Metro. Dist. No. 4, 145 B.R. 76, 82 (Bankr. D.
Colo. 1990). One court found that general authority was "sufficiently implied through a
grant of responsibility over fiscal matters combined with a grant of general discretionary
powers to implement the powers enumerated." Id. (citing In re Villages at Castle Rock
Metro. Dist. No. 4, 145 B.R. 76, 82 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1990)). General authority was
inferred from a municipality's authority over its own finances. See In re City of
Bridgeport, 128 B.R. 688, 693-97 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1991); In re City of Wellston, 43 B.R.
348 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1984). It was inferred from broad general powers of a municipality
to be a party to suits, to borrow money, to issue bonds, to refund any bond indebtedness,
to manage, control and supervise all of the business of district, and to exercise all rights
and powers necessary or incidental to or implied from such powers. See In re Villages at
Castle Rock Metro. Dist. No. 4, 145 B.R. 76,82 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1990). General authority
was inferred from a statute vesting municipal districts with "all the powers necessary and
requisite of the accomplishment for the purpose for which such district is created, capable
of being delegated by the legislature .... The district is empowered to do all acts
necessary, proper or convenient in the exercise of the powers granted herein." In re
Pleasant View Utility Dist., 24 B.R. 632 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1982) (quoting TENN. CODE
ANN. § 7-82-306 (1980)), leave to appealdenied, 27 B.R. 552 (M.D. Tenn. 1982).
26. See In re Westport Transit District, 165 B.R. 93, 98 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1994). See
also In re Carroll Township Authority, 119 B.R. 61 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1990), in which the
court relied on Congressional legislative history to conclude that some affirmative action
by the state was required in order to demonstrate its authorization. See id. at 63.

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 53

Any taxing agency or instrumentality of this State, as defined in
Section 81 of the act of Congress entitled 'An act to establish a
uniform system of bankruptcy throughout the United States,'
approved July 1, 1898, as amended, may file the petition mentioned
in Section 83 of the Act and prosecute to completion7 all
proceedings permitted by Sections 81, 82, 83 and 84 of the Act.2
Another provision of the Government Code, Section 43739,
speaks specifically to bankruptcy filings by certain cities. It states:
Any city authorized to refund its indebtedness pursuant to this
article may file a petition under any bankruptcy law of the United
States. If the refunding of the city indebtedness is authorized in the
bankruptcy proceeding, the city may refund its indebtedness
pursuant to this article.
Both provisions were enacted in 1949, when only general state
authorization was required. They both seem to provide fairly broad
authorization for California municipal entities to file for bankruptcy.
As I discuss below, Section 53760 should be substantively revised
to limit access based on the governor's discretion. As for Section
43739, it should probably be eliminated, so that only one general
authorizing statute exists for all municipal entities. To the extent that
particular types of entities may require special considerations in
connection with bankruptcy authorization or filings, those specifics
should also be contained in one general authorizing statute, and not
scattered throughout the various substantive sections of the
California code.'
Section 53760 also refers to a federal bankruptcy statute that is
no longer in effect. It refers to provisions of former Chapter IX of
the Bankruptcy Act that were enacted in 1937 and superseded in
1976. Because of potential ambiguities that may arise from the
obsolete statutory references," all statutory references should reflect
current law.

27. CAL. GovT. CODE § 53760 (1999). In addition, Government Code Section 53761
provides that "[t]he State consents to the adoption of Sections 81, 82, 83 and 84 by
Congress and consents to their application to the taxing agencies and instrumentalities of
this State." Md § 53761. This provision is probably unnecessary and adds nothing to the
authorization contained in Section 53760.
28. Id § 43739.
29. Under current law, for example, the superintendent of schools must authorize the
bankruptcy petition for an insolvent school district. See infra note 150.
30. While the language appears to offer broad and explicit authority for local agencies
to file bankruptcy, the court in Orange County specifically rejected such an argument.
Instead, the court decided that OCIP was neither a municipality under federal law, nor
specifically authorized under state law, because it did not fall within the laundry list of
agencies and instrumentalities enumerated in Section 81 of the 1937 Act. See In re County
of Orange, 183 B.R. 594,602 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1995).
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The next Part provides an overview of Chapter 9, its operation
and its limitations. The question of structuring a specific state
authorization regime is taken up in the following Parts.
H. Bankruptcy System Fundamentals
In this Part, I describe Chapter 9. I first provide an overview of
Chapter 9 and its benefits for the municipal debtor. I then discuss
Section 109(c) of the Code, which serves a gate keeping function with
respect to Chapter 9 and from which the state authorization
requirement derives.
A. Benefits of Chapter 9

For a municipality in financial distress, Chapter 9 provides
immediate relief from creditor collection efforts and offers a
framework within which to negotiate a restructuring of the
municipality's debt obligations. The immediate relief from creditors
comes in the form of a stay against creditor collection efforts, which is
triggered automatically upon the filing of a Chapter 9 petition.3' This
relief enables the municipality to avoid financial and operational
collapse, enabling it instead to continue to provide public services to
its residents and others while negotiating a plan of debt adjustment
with its creditors. While I briefly describe other salient features of
Chapter 9 as well-the ability to deal with unfavorable contracts and
the negotiation of the plan of adjustment-I focus particular attention
on the automatic stay and invocation of bankruptcy relief, which may
have particular relevance for the structuring of the mechanics of state
authorization.
(1) The Automatic Stay and Invocation of Bankruptcy Relief

As the Orange County bankruptcy illustrated, timely invocation
of the automatic stay and other bankruptcy relief may be critical to
the municipal debtor's ability to stabilize its financial position. In that
case, three disputes arose implicating the debtor's ability to rely on
the invocation of bankruptcy to protect assets from creditors. While
the debtor was ultimately unsuccessful in two of these disputes, the
novelty of the legal issues raised suggests that the final word has yet
to be written on these questions. I make no attempt to resolve these
novel bankruptcy questions, a project that is beyond the scope of this
Article. Instead, I recount these disputes simply to illustrate the
potential significance of timely invocation of municipal bankruptcy.
Early in the case, the County hoped to rely on the automatic stay
to block certain of its secured creditors from liquidating their
31. See 11 U.S.C. § 922 (1994).
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collateral.32 These secured creditors were investment banks with
which the County had entered into sophisticated financial contracts
called reverse repurchase agreements.33 As collateral for the County's
obligations under these reverse repurchase agreements, the
investment bank creditors held County-owned securities. Shortly
after the bankruptcy filing, these creditors liquidated their collateral,
despite the fact that such a move might have been a violation of the
automatic stay. While certain Bankruptcy Code provisions permit
such creditor action, it is unclear whether these provisions apply in
municipal bankruptcy.35 The issue was ultimately mooted by the
County's decision to liquidate its investment pool securities portfolio
shortly after the bankruptcy filing.36
A second dispute over the debtor's assets involved the rights of
holders of the County's tax revenue anticipation notes (TRANS) with
respect to certain pledged tax revenues. In its resolution approving
the County's $200,000,000 borrowing via issuance of the TRANS, the
County Board of Supervisors also pledged certain future tax and
other unrestricted revenues as security for the TRANS.37 The
resolution specified a schedule of anticipated revenues that were to
be set aside as they were received, in order to provide the promised
collateral." However, the County declared bankruptcy after only the
32. See County of Orange v. Nomura Securities Int'l, Inc., Adv. No. 94-02480 (Bankr.
S.D. Cal.) (complaint dismissed).
33. A reverse repurchase agreement is essentially a secured loan. The County
borrowed money to invest in securities, using securities it already owned as collateral for
these loans. The County was obligated to "repurchase" the collateral at a fixed date and
price, in effect retiring the loans. The interest rate is simply built into the repurchase
price. Failure to repurchase is similar to a loan default, and entitles the other party-the
"lender"-to foreclose on the collateral. See generallyPHILIPPE JORION, BIG BETS GONE
BAD: DERIVATIVES AND BANKRUPTCY IN ORANGE COuNTY 30-32 (1995).
34. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 555, 556, 559, 560 (permitting liquidation of securities agreements
by nondebtor party, notwithstanding certain provisions of Code, including automatic stay
provision).
35. While § 901(a) contains a laundry list of Bankruptcy Code provisions that
explicitly apply in Chapter 9, see 11 U.S.C. § 901(a), the provisions relating to liquidation
of securities agreements and similar financial contracts, see supra note 34, are not included
in the list. The National Bankruptcy Review Commission (the "NBRC") has
recommended that these provisions be specifically made applicable to Chapter 9 through
their inclusion in Section 901(a). See REPORT OF THE NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY REVIEv
COMMISSION 991 (1997) [hereinafter NBRC REPORT]. In addition, a provision so
amending Section 901(a) is included in the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001, which as of
this writing is pending in Congress. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001, § 502, S.420,
H.R. 333,107th Cong. § 502 (2001).
36. See JORION, supra note 33, at 104.
37. See Alliance Capital Mgmt. L.P. v. County of Orange (In re County of Orange),
179 B.R. 185, 188 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1995), rev'd on other grounds and remanded by 189
B.R. 499 (C.D. Cal. 1995).
38. See id.
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first three set-asides had been made, and it took the plausible position
that the invocation of bankruptcy cut off the TRANS holders' rights
to any post-bankruptcy revenues or set-asides."
Ordinarily, a secured creditor's prepetition consensual lien does
not extend to property acquired by the debtor after the filing of the
bankruptcy petition.
Therefore, the prompt invocation of
bankruptcy may enable the debtor to terminate secured creditors'
rights relating, for example, to a stream of income or other assets,
thereby preserving unencumbered assets for the estate, improving the
debtors' prospects for rehabilitation, and enhancing recoveries for
general unsecured creditors.
However, while the prepetition secured creditor is generally not
entitled to postpetition collateral, it is unclear how this rule applies to
a municipality's pledge of future tax revenues to secure its TRANS
obligations.41 The bankruptcy court agreed with the County that its
pledge was a "security interest," and therefore that the rights of the
TRANS holders were cut off at the time of the bankruptcy filing.42
However, the district court reversed on appeal, finding that the
pledge constituted a statutory lien that survived the bankruptcy
filing.43 Therefore, the lien rights of TRANS holders continued in the
County's future revenues as originally scheduled, and were not cut off
by the bankruptcy.
A third dispute involved the Orange County Investment Pool
(OCIP)4 and the claims of its participants, who wished to withdraw
their funds as the County and OCIP slid into financial distress. OCIP
was an investment pool started by the then-treasurer of Orange
County, Robert L. Citron. Under California law, certain government
entities could choose to deposit their excess funds into the county
treasury for investment by the county treasurer. Other government
entities were required to handle their excess funds this way.' From
these funds received by the County treasury, Citron created OCIP by
39. See icL at 188-89.
40. See 11 U.S.C. § 552(a).
41. This issue does not arise with respect to revenue bonds, as to which the lien on
special revenues survives the bankruptcy filing. See id. § 928(a). The TRANS, however,
were general obligation bonds. See Alliance Capital Mgmt., 179 B.R. at 191 n.17.
42. See Alliance CapitalMgmL, 179 B.R. at 194.
43. See Alliance Capital Mgmt, 189 B.R. at 501. The NBRC recommends an
amendment to the Code to allow similar treatment for TRANS as the Code currently
provides for revenue bonds. The pledge of tax revenues would survive in bankruptcy,
but-unlike revenue bonds-would be subject to the municipal debtor's use for
"necessary municipal services." See NBRC REPORT, supra note 35, at 999.
44. The financial chaos associated with OCIP is by now well known. For a description
of the background and state law authorization for OCIP, see In re County of Orange, 183
B.R. 594,596 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1995).
45. See id.
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combining the funds into several pools for investment purposes.46 By

1994, OCIP held $7.6 billion in investments for 190 municipal
entities.47
Because it was initially unclear whether OCIP could be a
Chapter 9 debtore and who owned the OCIP funds in bankruptcy, it
was also unclear whether pool participants had immediate rights to
the funds or whether the automatic stay precluded their withdrawals.
If the County held only as trustee for the various pool participants,
then those trust funds belonged to the beneficiaries, not the County.
Under this characterization, such funds would not have been subject
to the claims of county creditors, and the beneficiary-participants
would not have been subject to the automatic stay with respect to
these funds. The bankruptcy court ultimately found that, despite
state law creating a trust relation between the County and the pool
investors, the funds belonged to the County as a result of the
commingling of the assets in the pool.49 While this decision did not
arise in the automatic stay context, one of the consequences of this
ruling is that the automatic stay would have prevented pool
participants from withdrawing their funds without county approval.
While the Orange County case highlights the potential need for
timely invocation of municipal bankruptcy and the automatic stay, it
should be noted that Orange County's case was unusual insofar as it
involved an investment pool. The first and third issues described
above arose only because of OCIP operations. While similar
investment pool-related municipal bankruptcies are not out of the
question,50 the run-of-the-mill municipal entity does not operate a
hedge fund on the side, so the creditor collection issues will be more
straightforward. For these municipal entities, immediate invocation
of bankruptcy may not be as critical as for private businesses or
counties running investment pools.
As a practical matter, creditors of traditional municipal
debtors-school districts, hospital districts, and the like-have
relatively few collection devices at their disposal compared to
46. See id. at 596-97.
47. See id.
48. The bankruptcy court ultimately decided that OCIP did not qualify as a
municipality under federal bankruptcy law, and was therefore ineligible for Chapter 9. See
id. at 594. See also infra note 78 and accompanying text.
49. See County of Orange v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., 191 B.R. 1005, 1013 (Bankr.
C.D. Cal. 1996).
50. Despite the spectacular misfortunes of OCIP, investment pools are now a fairly
common phenomenon in California municipal finance, as cities and counties search for
new revenue sources in times of relative scarcity. Investment pools are quite different
from other more traditional municipal entities. Their operations and obligations are
different, and therefore financial distress related to an investment pool raises issues quite
different from the issues arising out of the bankruptcy of more traditional entities.
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creditors of private entities. Aside from the securities-related issues
raised in Orange County, municipal property is generally not subject
to creditor seizure to satisfy municipal debt. One could easily
imagine the social and political chaos that would ensue upon the
dismemberment of a municipal entity as creditors raced to seize the
municipality's assets.' The primary creditor remedy available upon
the municipal borrower's default is a state court action for
mandamus, by which a court orders the municipal debtor to exercise
its taxing power to raise the revenue necessary to pay the defaulted
debt. 2 The automatic stay precludes further pursuit of this remedy as
well.
(2) Dealingwith Unfavorable Contracts

For some municipalities, financial distress may require
adjustment of the municipality's ongoing contractual obligations, as
well as its debt obligations.
Chapter 9 provides a tool for
accomplishing this, allowing a municipality to reject or renegotiate
executory contracts. 3 Obligations to employees under collective
bargaining agreements, for example, may require modification, as the
Orange County case' and the bankruptcy of the San Jose Unified
School District in 1983 illustrate.55

(3) Negotiating the Planof Adjustment

The ultimate goal for the municipal debtor in Chapter 9 is to
reach agreement with creditors over the adjustment of municipal
debts. Typical debt adjustments include extending the maturity of
particular debt obligations or reducing the interest rate or principal
balance. Comprehensive adjustment is accomplished through a plan
of adjustment confirmed by the bankruptcy court.56 Confirmation

51. See McConnell & Picker, supranote 19, at 429.
52. See iL
53. See 11 U.S.C. § 365 (1994), which is made applicable to Chapter 9 by 11 U.S.C. §
901(a).
54. See Orange County Employees Ass'n v. County of Orange, 179 B.R. 177, 184-85
(Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1995).
55. See Barry Winograd, San Jose Revisited: A Proposalfor Negotiated Modification
of Public Sector BargainingAgreements Rejected Under Chapter9 of the Bankruptcy Code,
37 HASTINGS L.J. 231 (1985). One primary purpose for the ultimately unsuccessful
bankruptcy filing of the city of Bridgeport, Connecticut, was the modification of its labor
contracts. See Thomas Scheffey, BridgeportBankruptcy No 'Slam Dunk Case': Specialists
Say Whether City Had Authority to File up in the Air in Historically Unprecedented
Scenario, THE RECORDER, June 20, 1991, at 3. See generally W. Richard Fossey & John
M. Sedor, In re Copper River School District: Collective Bargaining and Chapter 9
MunicipalBankruptcy, 6 ALASKA L. REv. 133 (1989).
56. See 11 U.S.C. § 943.

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 53

enables the debtor, with the requisite creditor majorities,' to bind
dissenting minority creditors to the terms of the plan of adjustment.
While the requirements for confirmation are numerous, the most
significant general requirements are that the plan must be proposed
in good faith, 58 that all creditor classes impaired under the plan must
accept the plan, 9 and that the plan is in the best interests of
creditors. 6'
B.

Debtor Control in Chapter 9

By enabling a municipal debtor to impair contracts, Chapter 9
affords the debtor significant leverage over its creditors in negotiating
debt adjustments. Because of considerations of state sovereignty,
however, Chapter 9 imposes almost no countervailing restrictions or
limitations on municipal operations or asset disposition. The
municipal governance structure remains in place, free to operate
without court or creditor interference. In effect, Chapter 9 provides
the municipal debtor with a hefty club to wield over creditors, without
giving creditors much in the way of protective mechanisms that are
available in corporate and individual bankruptcy. On the other hand,
municipalities' access to Chapter 9 is much more restricted compared
to other types of debtors filing under other chapters of the
Bankruptcy Code. Section 109(c) of the Bankruptcy Code serves this
gate keeping function for municipal bankruptcy. This section briefly
illustrates debtor control in Chapter 9 by contrasting the municipal
debtor's position with the more familiar position of the corporate
debtor under Chapter 11. The next section then discusses gate
keeping under Section 109(c).
Unlike Chapter 11, the scope of federal court authority over a
municipal debtor is quite limited. Sections 903 and 904 of the
Bankruptcy Code capture the limited approach of Chapter 9. Section
903 provides: "This chapter does not limit or impair the power of a
State to control, by legislation or otherwise, a municipality of or in
such State in the exercise of the political or governmental powers of
such municipality, including expenditures for such exercise."61
Section 904 clarifies:

57. See id. §§ 901(a), 1126(c).
58. See id §§ 901(a), 1129(a)(3).
59. See id. §§ 901(a), 1129(a)(8). A plan may also be crammed down over the
objection of an impaired class. See id. § 1129(b). However, cram down in Chapter 9
works a little differently from Chapter 11. See 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTcY 943.03[1][f]
(15th ed. rev'd 1999).
60. See 11 U.S.C. § 943(b)(7).
61. Id § 903.
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Notwithstanding any power of the court, unless the debtor consents
or the plan so provides, the court may not, by any stay, order, or
decree, in the case or otherwise, interfere with
(1) any of the political or governmental powers of the debtor;
(2) any of the property or revenues of the debtor; or
(3) the debtor's use or enjoyment of any income-producing

property.'

While particular provisions of the Bankruptcy Code constrain
the Chapter 11 debtor's operations and negotiating leverage with
creditors, municipal debtors suffer no analogous constraints. Unlike
the Chapter 11 debtor, the Chapter 9 debtor is free to use its assets
without interference by the bankruptcy court.6 It need not fear that 6a
bankruptcy trustee will be appointed to take control of operations. 6
Its ability to borrow money postbankruptcy remains unconstrained.
The debtor may employ and compensate professionals without prior
court approval.6
Creditors may not place a municipality into
involuntary bankruptcy. 7 They cannot force the municipal debtor's
liquidation.6 Nor are they guarantied a minimum "liquidation value"
payout under the municipal debtor's reorganization plan.69 Creditors
have no right to file their own plans; only the debtor may file a plan.
The municipal debtor is probably also not subject to the limitations

62. Id § 904.
63. See iL Compareidt § 363.
64. Compare id § 1104. A trustee can be appointed only for the limited purpose of
pursing avoidance actions on behalf of the estate if the debtor refuses to do so. See id §
926(a).
65. Compare id. § 364. "Only when the municipality needs special authority, such as
subordination of existing liens, or special priority for the borrowed funds, will the court
become involved in the authorization." H.R. REP. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1" Sess. 394
(1977).
66. Compare i. §§ 327-331. One confirmation requirement, however, is that "all
amounts to be paid by the debtor or by any person for services or expenses in the case or
incident to the plan have been fully disclosed and are reasonable." Id § 943(b)(3).
67. Compare iL § 303.
68. Compare i. § 1112.
69. There is a requirement that any plan be in the "best interests" of creditors, see hi. §
943(b)(7), which in the context of corporate bankruptcy was historically interpreted to
require that creditors receive as much under the plan as they would have in liquidation.
That requirement for corporate bankruptcy is now reflected in Section 1129(a)(7). With a
municipality, on the other hand, liquidation is not an option, so the best interest
requirement in the Chapter 9 context cannot refer to liquidation values. Instead, the
legislative history of Chapter 9 suggests that the test requires that creditors receive in
bankruptcy at least what they would have received by virtue of a mandamus proceeding
under state law to compel an increased tax levy by the municipality in order to pay off the
debt. See McConnell & Picker, supra note 19, at 465-66 & n.178.
70. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 941 with id. § 1121.
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imposed on corporate debtors with respect to rejecting collective
bargaining agreements or modifying retiree benefits.7'
In all these areas, municipal debtors enjoy more freedom from
court oversight and more leverage over their creditors than do private
business debtors in Chapter 11.
C. Gate Keeping under Section 109(c)
While municipal debtors enjoy far more leverage over creditors
in bankruptcy than their private counterparts, access to municipal
bankruptcy is also more restricted. The specific state authorization
requirement under Section 109(c)(2) operates as a gate keeping
device restricting access to municipal bankruptcy, one that is
completely within the control of the various states. Section 109(c)
enumerates other eligibility requirements for Chapter 9 as well:
An entity may be a debtor under chapter 9 of this title if and only if
such entity(1) is a municipality;
(2) is specifically authorized, in its capacity as a municipality or
by name, to be a debtor under such chapter by State law, or by
a governmental officer or organization empowered by State
law to authorize such entity to be a debtor under such chapter;
(3) is insolvent;
(4) desires to effect a plan to adjust such debts; and
(5) (A) has obtained the agreement of creditors holding at
least a majority in amount of the claims of each class that
such entity intends to impair under a plan in a case under
such chapter;
(B) has negotiated in good faith with creditors and has
failed to obtain the agreement of creditors holding at least
a majority in amount of the claims of each class that such
entity intends to impair under a plan in a case under such
chapter;
(C) is unable to negotiate with creditors because such
negotiation is impracticable; or
(D) reasonably believes that a creditor may attempt to
obtain a transfer that is avoidable under section 547 of this
title.
Besides these requirements, the petition must have been filed in
good faith.'
In order to provide context for the subsequent
discussion concerning state authorization, I briefly describe some of
these other hurdles to invoking municipal bankruptcy protection.
71. Compare id. §§ 1113, 1114 respectively. See also Orange County Employees Ass'n
v. County of Orange, 179 B.R. 177 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1995).
72. See id. § 921(c).

April 2002]

AFTER ORANGE COUNTY

(1) Municipality

Only municipalities are eligible for Chapter 9. A municipality is
defined as a "political subdivision or public agency or instrumentality
of a State."' "Political subdivision" includes counties, cities, towns,
and the like,74 that exercise various sovereign powers such as the
taxing power, the power of eminent domain, or the police power.'
"Public agency or instrumentality" includes incorporated authorities,
commissions, and similar public agencies organized for the purpose of
constructing, maintaining, and operating revenue-producing

enterprises. The term also includes local improvement districts,
school districts, and the like, organized or created for the purpose of
constructing, improving, maintaining, and operating improvements,
schools, ports, etc.76

When a bankruptcy petition was filed on behalf of OCIP, the
court dismissed the petition, finding that OCIP was neither a political
subdivision nor a public agency.
As to whether it was an
instrumentality of the state, the court found that OCIP's
characteristics and objectives did not comport with those of entities
historically identified as instrumentalities. 7 Moreover, that OCIP was
an instrumentality of the County did not make it an instrumentality of
the state for purposes of Chapter 9.78 This analysis has been
criticized. 79

(2) Insolvency

A municipality must be insolvent to be eligible for Chapter 9.
Insolvency in the municipal context is a bit different from insolvency
in the context of private entities. A traditional comparison of assets
and liabilities is not useful, given difficulties of valuing municipal
assets and the inability of creditors to force the liquidation of a
73. Id § 101(40).
74. See In re County of Orange, 183 B.R. 594,601 n.16 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1995).
75. See id.
at 602.
76. See id. at 602-03.
77. See id.
78. See id. The court found that OCIP was unlike any of the several types of
instrumentalities enumerated in the 1937 Bankruptcy Act that was a predecessor to the
current statute. The court further held that OCIP was not specifically authorized under
California law to file for bankruptcy, since California's authorization provision refers
specifically to this same laundry list of instrumentalities from the superseded statute. See
id.
79. See 6 COLLIER, supra note 59, at 900.02[2][a][iii]. Creditors also argued that
OCIP was not an entity, and was therefore not eligible under Section 109(c). Creditors
claimed that OCIP was merely a legal fiction created on the eve of bankruptcy for the
purpose of filing a bankruptcy petition. See County of Orange, 183 B.R. at 599. The court
found, however, that OCIP had a separate existence long before its bankruptcy, and that it
was a governmental unit, which by definition qualifies as an "entity." See id.
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municipality to satisfy their debts. For municipalities, insolvency is
defined in Section 101(32)(C) to mean a "financial condition such
that the municipality is (i) not generally paying its debts as they
become due unless such debts are the subject of a bona fide dispute;
or (ii) unable to pay its debts as they become due."'
The bankruptcy filing for the city of Bridgeport, Connecticut,
was dismissed because the court found that the debtor was not
insolvent." The court clarified that the financial inability must be
"imminent and certain, not merely a possibility or speculation. ' ' 2
This requirement operates as something of a screening device to
assure that federal bankruptcy powers are not prematurely invoked
to intrude on a municigality's negotiation with its creditors and
employees over finances.
(3) Good Faith

In addition to the eligibility requirements spelled out in Section
109(c), the Code provides for the dismissal of any Chapter 9 petition
not filed in good faith.' For lack of any precedent construing this
provision in Chapter 9, the Orange County court adopted the Ninth
Circuit's good faith test for Chapter 11 filings: "whether the debtor is
attempting to unreasonably deter and harass its creditors or
attempting to effect a speedy, efficient reorganization on a feasible
basis."" In addition, "the purpose of the filing must be to achieve
objectives within the legitimate scope of the bankruptcy laws." 6

Having sketched the contours of Chapter 9 and the gate keeping
function of Section 109(c), we turn to the question of designing an
appropriate state authorization mechanism.
IHL. Managing Access to Chapter 9: First Principles
In this Part, I discuss basic considerations that should inform the
design of a state law gate keeping device for municipal bankruptcy.
80. 11 U.S.C. § 101(32)(C) (1994).
81. See In re City of Bridgeport, 129 B.R. 332,339 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1991).
82. Id. at 337.
83. Moreover, this and the prerequisite that the debtor have made at least some effort
to negotiate with creditors to obtain their consent to a plan, see supra Part II[C], give some
comfort to the municipal bond market that bankruptcy protection will not be too readily
accessible. See 6 COLLIER, supra note 59, at I 900.02[2][e].
84. See 11 U.S.C. § 921(c).
85. In re County of Orange, 183 B.R. 594, 608 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1995) (citing In re
Marsch, 36 F.3d 825, 828 (9th Cir. 1994), In re Arnold, 806 F.2d 937, 939 (9th Cir. 1986)).
86. County of Orange,183 B.R. at 608.
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In determining the proper role for the state in managing access to
Chapter 9, I consider, among other things, competing interests in
local autonomy versus statewide fiscal management, and the politics
of municipal financial distress. In addressing the difficult trade-offs
that must be made, it may be useful to distinguish large, multipurpose
municipal entities-cities and counties-from smaller or more
specialized entities-school or hospital or irrigation districts and the
like. The former are generally the more complex, both politically and
economically. For the bulk of the following discussion, cities and
counties are our primary concern. Smaller and more specialized
entities are separately considered at the end of this Part.
In the next Part, I detail my recommendation.
A. The Fundamental Tension: Statewide Impact of Bankruptcy versus
Local Autonomy

Resort to bankruptcy may have consequences not only for the
filing entity; it may also affect borrowing costs for governmental
borrowers statewide.' It may have other negative effects as well. On
the other hand, state involvement in municipal financial affairs may
infringe on local autonomy and may hamper local efforts to address a
fiscal crisis that requires timely and finely tuned action.
In general, preservation of local autonomy is important. SB 349,
which was passed in the 1995 legislative session but vetoed by thengovernor Wilson, would have created a Local Area Bankruptcy
Committee ("LABC"), composed of the state controller, treasurer,
and director of finance, that would decide on municipal bankruptcy
authorization.Y Governor Wilson's veto message concerning SB 349
expressed the sentiment that the bill "would inappropriately vest
responsibility for local fiscal affairs at the state level, creating an
instrument of state government to usurp the authority of local
officials to decide the wisdom of a bankruptcy filing." 9 Moreover,
official opponents of SB 349 included the California Municipal
Treasurers Association and the Association of California Water
Agencies.'o
State intervention in local affairs should occur only in
exceptional circumstances, and not without some specific purpose. In
my view, however, municipal financial distress is an exceptional
87. Moreover, the structuring of a system of state authorization may by itself affect
borrowing costs in subtle ways, independent of any particular municipality's financial
distress. For example, too liberal access to Chapter 9 may raise overall borrowing costs by
forcing the financial markets to account for the general future possibility of municipal
repudiation of debts.
88. See S.B. 349, 1995-96 Sess. (Cal. 1995).
89. S.B. 349 Veto (Sept. 30, 1996).
90. See S.B. 349, Senate Floor Analyses (Aug. 29, 1996).
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occasion that begs for state involvement and may justify active
intervention. Municipal financial distress generally implicates more
than merely the local interests of the distressed entity. Bankruptcy
may provide a municipality quick relief from certain of its debt
obligations, but the municipality-and other state and local
borrowers-will end up paying in the financial markets. Regardless
of what route is chosen, the costs of default do not disappear. The

municipal debt markets will respond to default by raising interest
rates, not only for the defaulting debtor in its attempts at future

borrowing, 91 but for other municipalities in the state, and to some
extent for municipal borrowers in general.'
In the aftermath of the Orange County bankruptcy, for instance,
many California issuers of public debt were forced to resort to letters
of credit in order to enhance the quality of their issues.' "We all paid
a penalty for Orange County. Orange County rocked and rolled the
market. Some governments and markets with good reserves still paid
'
a penalty in the marketplace."94
According to one estimate,
California local government entities issuing short-term notes during
the summer following Orange County's bankruptcy filing were
required to offer higher yields of fifteen to twenty-five basis points.
Together with an additional twenty basis points for bond insurance,
some of these California government issuers paid almost an
additional half percentage point for their borrowings. For an

91. In June 1996, Orange County issued $880 million in recovery bonds to pay its
prebankruptcy creditors and exit from bankruptcy. The bonds were priced to yield ten to
twenty-five basis points more than similarly rated bonds, which translates into an extra
$43.8 million in interest costs. Overall, the county paid about $60 million extra to borrow,
including higher underwriting fees, higher returns to investors, and the costs of bond
insurance. See Debora Vrana, O.C. Bankruptcy All but Over, L. A. TIMES, June 6, 1996,
at Al (quoting Zane Mann, publisher of California Municipal Bond Advisor).
92. Default on municipal bond indebtedness may have serious ramifications for the
entire U.S. municipal bond market. General obligation bonds, for example, are simply
unsecured debt obligations backed by the issuer's "full faith and credit," a commitment
that the municipality will resort to its taxing powers if necessary to satisfy the debt.
Bankruptcy signals the issuer's dishonor of its full faith and credit commitment, which
shakes the market's confidence, not just with respect to the defaulting municipality but
with respect to municipal issuers generally.
93. See Arlene Jacobious, Thanks to Improving Fiscal Picture, L.A. County to Sell
Unenhanced TRANS, THE BOND BUYER, July 17, 1997, at 1 (quoting Maureen Sicotte,
director of finance and investments for Los Angeles County).
94. Id. Some market participants expected the State of California to step in to assure
Orange County's timely debt repayment, and Orange County's failure to reaffirm its
obligations unequivocally may have eroded the trust between municipal issuers and
investors. See The Effect of the Orange County Crisis on Investors and Issuers,
Commission Report on Government, 27 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (LRP), News and Comment, No.
13 at A8 (Aug. 15, 1995) (quoting Congressional testimony of Daniel Heimowitz, Director
of Public Finance Department of Moody's Investors Services).
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expected $7 billion in aggregate seasonal note borrowings, the extra
interest cost would run about $15 million annually.9
The California legislature recognized the statewide implications
of municipal default in enacting financial control provisions for
Orange County in SB 1276:
It is in the interest of the state and all public debt issuers within the
state to enable the County of Orange to finance an acceptable plan
of adjustment in order to improve the credit standing of California
public debt issuers and to preserve and protect the health, safety,
and welfare of the residents of the county and the state. To that
end, successfully resolving the county bankruptcy and restoring the
financial position of county government is a matter of statewide
interest and concern. 6
Moreover, the effects of a significant municipal default may be
felt nationwide. The Orange County bankruptcy filing caused a run
on the Texas Investment Pool. ' It apparently also raised municipal
borrowing costs in Maine, according to the state treasurer. 98
Financial markets harbor some implicit expectation that the state
will stand behind a defaulting municipality's bond obligations. This is
understandable, given that state governments have always come to
the aid of their distressed municipalities.
While a local government may fall from fiscal grace, the perceived
wisdom is that the state will step in to clean up the mess. In almost
all cases involving general units of government and tax-supported
debt, that has been the case. New York City, Cleveland,
Philadelphia, Bridgeport, even little Chelsea in Massachusetts, were
thrown a lifeline by the state. Their respective states swam through
the often shark-infested waters of politics to effect a rescue. Not
since the default of Detroit in the 1930s had a state failed to
intervene to head off a default or bankruptcy by a major local
government. 99
In California especially, expectations of state intervention seem
reasonable, as the state budget and the budgets of its counties are all
interrelated. Beginning with Proposition 13 in 1978, when taxing and
spending restrictions were placed on state and local governments,

95. See John E. Petersen, A Guide to the MunicipalBond Market: The Post-Orange
County Era,GOVERNING (Nov. 1995).
96. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 30400 (1999).
97. See JORION, supra note 33, at 74.
98. See Municipal Markets Lobby for Change; The Trouble with Chapter9, 28 Bankr.
Ct. Dec. (LRP), News and Comment, No. 22, at Al (May 5, 1996).
99. Petersen, supra note 95. See also BALDASSARE, supra note 1, at 86 (1998). "In
every other major credit crisis in government in the last 25 years, states have taken a lead
role....
There is an implied moral obligation of states to help their municipalities." Id.,
quoting Sally Hofmneister, Bankruptcy Peculiarto California,N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 1995, at
D1.
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counties have become highly dependent on the state to provide the
necessary funding for local services."10
Because municipal bankruptcy is not "free," resort to Chapter 9
should not be done casually. Moreover, because of the possible
statewide spillover effects, local autonomy concerns must give way to
statewide fiscal concerns, and objections to state involvement in the
decision whether to resort to Chapter 9 should be discounted.
Bankruptcy of a major municipality will almost certainly raise
borrowing costs for other California municipalities and the state, and
the bankruptcy process itself is expensive. These potential spillover
effects suggest that the decision to declare bankruptcy should not be
left to the sole discretion of any municipality. In the context of
considering reforms to federal bankruptcy law, a working group
report of the National Bankruptcy Review Commission asserted:
It is simply "wrong" to allow a financially troubled municipality,
whose problems reach and affect not only its own citizens and
constituencies but affect others throughout the state, to unilaterally
seek relief under the bankruptcy laws without prior authorization
from the state within which it operates."'
Given that the costs of default will be borne by the state as a
whole, and given the connection between state allocations and local
budgets, the state government should have the opportunity to
consider whether bankruptcy is the best approach to the problem.
While bankruptcy might be the best of a number of unattractive
alternatives, and perhaps the costs of municipal default should be
spread throughout the state under some circumstances, that decision
is essentially a political one that implicates the entire state. A
distressed municipality should not be authorized to decide the
question unilaterally. For similar reasons, conditions imposed on a
filing municipality should not be inhibited by home rule concerns
when a fiscal crisis will have statewide impact. Trusteeship provisions
were ultimately enacted in connection with the Orange County
bankruptcy, and my proposal incorporates the possibility of similar
mechanisms.02
B. The Politics and Economics of State Involvement

Resolution of a serious crisis will often require some kind of
eventual state involvement.
As an historical matter, state
governments have always come to the aid of large cities in distress.'
100. See BALDASSARE, supra note 1, at 86.
101. See Commission Report on Government, 29 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (LRP), News and

Comment, No. 8 (Aug. 13, 1996) (quoting National Bankruptcy Review Commission
report of Working Group on Government as Creditor or Debtor).
102. See infra Part IV[B][4].
103. See supranote 99 and accompanying text.
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Especially in California, where municipalities are restricted in their
ability to raise taxes even in the face of financial crisis, the state may
be the only possible source of the necessary financing.'
However, in California, given the absence of a comprehensive
framework for state involvement, political and economic dynamics
may impede timely joint action by state and local officials. Local
officials may prefer not to involve state officials unless and until it is
absolutely unavoidable, and state officials may be reluctant to get
involved as well. These predilections are understandable. Local
officials might fear that state involvement would hamper local action
and cause negative publicity. And negative publicity might hurt the
municipal entity's restructuring efforts, as well as create political
embarrassment to the local officials. For their part, state officials may
likewise be reluctant to get involved. Not only will they not have the
intimate familiarity with local issues and local history that municipal
officials have, but state officials may also fear getting tarred with the
political fallout from the crisis if they intervene too early or too
aggressively.
In terms of a state authorization regime, the current system of
blanket authorization to file bankruptcy may be a politically
attractive arrangement. Local officials do not have to give up any
control to state officers. Local officials will be certain that a
bankruptcy "out" is available if necessary. State officials enjoy
insulation from any negative fallout from the local crisis, and no
No special
immediate state budgetary issues are implicated.
appropriation need be made to resolve the crisis. State officials can
simply wait and see. Moreover, the short-term financial costs
imposed as a result of the municipal filing are largely invisible from a
budgetary standpoint. Those costs come in the form of higher
borrowing costs for other municipal issuers, a consequence for which
no state official need be blamed.
The political dynamics suggest that, absent some specific
incentive to do otherwise, state and local officials may join forces too
late, rather than too early. But in general, it may be preferable to err
on the side of early state involvement. State participation assures that
statewide interests are considered in the formulation and execution of
a strategy for addressing the crisis, and early involvement may serve
to avoid some of the costs of distress.
Moreover, bankruptcy need not necessarily precede a
comprehensive plan of debt restructuring.0 5 It may be that state

104. See BALDASSARE, supra note 1, at 26. Orange County voters ovenvhelmingly
rejected a proposed half-cent sales tax increase to fund the County's bankruptcy recovery.
See id at 160.
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involvement could help avoid the need for a bankruptcy filing,
thereby minimizing the fallout from a default. State involvement
could pave the way for whatever state approvals-executive or
legislative-may be required to implement a restructuring outside of
bankruptcy. An emergency appropriation or state credit could help
to contain a crisis, while setting certain terms and conditions for
restructuring. For example, when New York City encountered fiscal
problems in 1975, the state intervened. It created agencies to
guaranty the city's loans, while imposing fiscal controls on city
government.1" New York and other states, anticipating municipal
financial distress, have enacted comprehensive mechanisms for state
intervention. These mechanisms generally incorporate the possibility
of a bankruptcy filing, but do not depend on it."
Any plan for resolution of fiscal crisis will have to address the
concerns of creditors, residents, and possibly employees. Whatever
arrangement is reached among the municipality and these various
constituencies will require state involvement. But no deal will be cut
without some mechanism to hold everyone's feet to the fire.
Bankruptcy could be that mechanism-as it was in Orange Countybut it might not have to be. Prebankruptcy state intervention should
at least be considered. Bankruptcy may be politically palatable in the
short run, but it is an expensive mechanism in terms of both direct
and indirect costs, and these costs are distributed haphazardly
through the workings of the bond markets."° Moreover, a bankruptcy
filing may be interpreted as the municipality's repudiation of its full
faith and credit commitment to its bondholders-its commitment to
resort to its taxing powers if necessary to satisfy its debt."°
A discretionary bankruptcy authorization mechanism requiring
approval of state officials would encourage early interaction. Local
officials, anticipating the possibility of financial distress, would wish
to explore the bankruptcy option. But to do that, they would have to
consult with the state officials responsible for authorizing the
bankruptcy filing. That is, they would have to involve state officials in
their bankruptcy planning. State officials, knowing they might have
105. Indeed, Section 109(c) contemplates that a municipality may already have
negotiated a plan satisfactory to the majority of its creditors by the time it files for
bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(5)(A) (1994). Chapter 9 would then simply be used to
impose the plan over the objection of any minority dissenting creditors.
106. See BALDASSARE, supra note 1, at 11. This is not to suggest that the nature of
New York City's fiscal problems were similar to Orange County's. However, in these
cases and others, state involvement is almost always required.
107. See infra Part IV.
108. After municipal bankruptcy and default, the next municipality interested in
floating a bond issue will suffer higher interest rates in the market, or will simply do
without the financing.
109. See BALDASSARE, supra note 1, at 119.
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to decide whether to authorize a bankruptcy filing, would hopefully
take an active role in addressing the problem up front. Placing this
responsibility on state officials encourages and requires them to focus
on the crisis early and to consider its statewide implications. Such
implications may be significant-as in Orange County-or
insignificant. A hands-off approach at the state level may or may not
be appropriate in given cases. But simple inertia should not be the
reason for a lack of proactive state involvement.
Throughout the Orange County crisis, the governor and other
state officials had apparently been kept well informed by county
officials. However, the state took no action-formal or informaluntil after bankruptcy was filed in December 1994, even though signs
of financial demise were readily apparent months before the filing.
The Orange County treasurer's race in the spring of 1994 called
attention to the high risk of the OCIP portfolio. John Moorlach,
challenger to the incumbent Treasurer Robert Citron, warned in May
1994 that OCIP had already lost $1.2 billion because of interest rate
hikes by the Federal Reserve that had begun in February. His dire
predictions were discounted to some extent as mere political attack
on the incumbent. However, by mid-November, outside auditors
retained by the County confirmed a $1.5 billion loss. When the
County could not convince its investment bankers not to foreclose on
their collateral for the County's reverse repurchase agreements, the
County filed for bankruptcy on December 6, 1994.110

Even after the filing, the state made no official move to
intervene. Instead, there was mutual finger pointing between state
and county officials as to who should bear blame for their failure to
work together to avoid the bankruptcy.'
Unofficially, Governor
Wilson convinced a former member of his administration, Tom
Hayes, to step in to manage OCIP shortly after the bankruptcy
filing.' The governor's ties to Orange County presumably helped to
pave the way for Hayes' appointment by the county Board of
Supervisors. "The governor had accomplished a new kind of 'state
intervention.' The county government had retained the former state
treasurer as the overseer of the failed investment fund.'.

3

It was only after the County had declared bankruptcy and
defaulted on bond obligations, county taxpayers rejected a proposed
half-cent sales tax increase, and the County worked out settlement
terms with investment pool participants, that the legislature acted in
110. See id. at 175.
111. See iLat 121.
112. Hayes had been state treasurer and state auditor-general under Wilson.
JORION, supra note 33, at 78.
113. BALDASSARE, supranote 1, at 122.

See
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furtherance of a comprehensive resolution of the crisis."' While it is
unclear, given the politics of the situation and the complexity of the
legal issues involved, whether a comprehensive settlement could have
been accomplished without resort to bankruptcy,"5 in other cases,
bankruptcy and default may be avoidable-or their impact lessenedif the financial expertise and resources of the state are made available
early on.
C.

Miscellaneous Issues

(1) Moral Hazard

In designing a framework to manage access to municipal
bankruptcy, we should consider not only the question of how best to
handle an imminent financial crisis. We should also consider how
best to avoid crises and to address their impact at the earliest possible
point. Some crises are, of course, unavoidable. However, to the
extent that bankruptcy is or is perceived to be a "safety valve" for
municipal entities, the safety valve should not be made too easily
available.
Requiring approval of state officials means that municipal access
to bankruptcy protection is never certain. Moreover, the prospect of
state involvement may mean a curtailing of local autonomy, with
possible political costs to local officials. Therefore, at the margin,
municipal officials have some incentive to steer a more conservative
fiscal course than they might if bankruptcy were always a ready
alternative." 6 Assuming that local officials do not relish involvement
of state officials in local affairs, a state approval requirement and the
prospect of further state involvement provide additional incentive to
avoid financial distress.
(2) Confidentiality

Confidentiality may also matter in the early stages of a financial
crisis. A municipality will wish to avoid panicking residents and
employees, and one whose bonds are publicly traded will wish to
avoid roiling the markets. Introducing state officials into the mix may
create some confidentiality risks. Any bankruptcy authorization
mechanism should be structured to avoid or at least minimize this
risk.
114. See infra note 159 and accompanying text.
115. Experts and observers disagree as to whether a bankruptcy filing was necessary.
See 28 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (LRP), News and Comment, No. 9, at Al (February 6, 1996).
116. This is not to say that municipal officials do not already have significant political
and other constraints that demand their fiscal vigilance. However, uncertainty as to
bankruptcy access may also influence local fiscal decisions.
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(3) Smaller or SpecializedEntities

Problems of statewide financial impact will be greatest, of course,
with the large municipalities-large cities and counties. Financial
distress for smaller municipal entities may not raise these same
concerns. However, for these smaller entities, resort to Chapter 9
may be ill advised for other reasons. Certain types of municipal
entities may not be ideal candidates for bankruptcy, not because of
any widespread impact of their financial demise or any effect on
financial markets. Instead, for some municipalities, the complexity
and expense of municipal bankruptcy may make it a poor device for
handling financial crisis. In the Orange County case, for example,
fees for the County's bankruptcy attorneys and other professionals
totaled about $50 million by the end of the case. This figure does not
include the costs of the County's postbankruptcy lawsuits or
professional fees for OCIP participants.'17 For a small pest control
district or sewage district, resort to bankruptcy may generate more
costs than it saves. For smaller entities, the bankruptcy process may
not be cost-justified.
Distinguishing among the multifarious municipal entities that
exist in California in terms of their suitability for Chapter 9 is another
reason for limiting access at state officials' discretion.
Crafting a workable system of state involvement is hardly a
simple affair. Political deadlock might possibly thwart a timely
response to fiscal crisis. However, if managed properly, as described
below, state involvement need not hinder or delay financial
restructuring, and may in fact facilitate it. Operational issues like
timeliness, predictability, flexibility, and interests in minimizing
threshold litigation are discussed below in the context of my basic
framework for discretionary access.
IV. Structuring the Appropriate System
In this Part, I describe my proposal, which places with the
governor the discretion to authorize municipal bankruptcy filings. As
prologue, I survey the range of plausible approaches to structuring a
state authorization mechanism, discussing the general advantages and
drawbacks to each basic approach. I then outline my proposal and
explain how it attempts to resolve the various tensions.
A. Municipal Bankruptcy Authorization: The Range of Approaches
In this section, I consider plausible approaches to structuring a
state authorization mechanism for municipal bankruptcy. Other
states' approaches, as well as the bills introduced in the California
117. See BALDASSARE, supra note 1, at 180.
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legislature in the aftermath of the Orange County bankruptcy, give
some flavor of the range of available alternatives. Approaches range
from blanket, unqualified authorization for all of a state's municipal
entities to express prohibition across the board. In the middle are
proposals requiring straightforward prior approval or some exercise
of discretion by state officials. Some states have also devised
elaborate nonbankruptcy approaches to municipal financial distress,
sometimes including bankruptcy as an option.! These approaches
may lead to outright takeover of a distressed municipal entity by a
state government.
(1) Blanket Authorization

A dozen or so states authorize unfettered access to municipal
bankruptcy for some or all of their municipal entities.119 Blanket
authorization for all municipal entities otherwise eligible under
federal law has the virtues of simplicity and definiteness. This
approach provides the municipality with maximum flexibility in
dealing with its financial distress and negotiating with creditors. It
reduces the likelihood of bankruptcy court litigation over the scope of
state law authorization.12 It would appear to enable a timely filing,
once the municipality has decided to enter bankruptcy.
However, these apparent advantages and their apparent
popularity with some states should not be overstated. Even assuming
clear state authorization, litigation may arise with respect to the other
federal gate keeping requirements of Section 109(c)-for example,
whether the entity qualifies as a municipality or whether it is
insolvent. 2' Therefore, some amount of uncertainty will always exist
as to a municipality's ready access to Chapter 9.
Even assuming that a blanket authorization provision could
provide definiteness and flexibility to a municipality in distress, it has
118. See DEP'T OF PUB. ADMIN., COPING WITH FISCAL DISTRESS IN PENNSYLVANIA'S
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS: A PROGRAM EVALUATION OF ACT 47 app. 4 (PA State Univ.
Graduate Sch. of Pub. Pol'y & Admin. 1991) [hereinafter COPING WITH FISCAL

DISTRESS] (summarizing municipal distress statutes of Florida, Illinois, Maine, Michigan,
Nevada, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, and Ohio).
119. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. California's existing authorization
statute, Section 53760 of the Government Code, would appear to offer broad
authorization as well. Though outdated with respect to its references to federal
bankruptcy law, the statute essentially authorizes to any California "taxing agency or
instrumentality" to file bankruptcy. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. However,
the Orange County court found that the statute was not broad enough to cover OCIP. See
supra note 30 and accompanying text.
120. Recall the litigation that occurred under the predecessor provision to current
Section 109(c)(2), which required only generalstate authorization for a municipality to file
bankruptcy. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
121. See supraPart II[CJ.
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one fundamental shortcoming insofar as it ignores the possible
statewide financial impact of a municipal filing. By providing blanket
access to Chapter 9 without some explicit mechanism for state
intervention, the state foregoes its opportunity and responsibility to
act to minimize the possible statewide costs of financial distress,
which will be borne indirectly by other municipalities and the state as
a whole."z
Like California, some states enacted blanket authorization
provisions decades ago and never revised them. Washington State,
for instance, authorizes "any taxing district" to "file the petition
mentioned in section 80 of chapter IX of the federal bankruptcy
act."
This is the same obsolete reference found in California's
authorizing provision. The Washington statute was enacted in 1935.124

Given that the vast majority of municipal filings have historically
involved small special purpose entities-irrigation districts, school
districts, and the like-and that the bankruptcy of a city or county is
extremely rare, it is not surprising that states enacting authorization
provisions fifty or sixty years ago would have failed to consider
possible statewide
ramifications from bankruptcy filings by cities and
5
counties."

122. See supra Part II[A].
123. WASH. REV. CODE § 39.64.040 (1999).
124. See idL
125. Moreover, what initially appear to be "blanket" authorization provisions
sometimes turn out to be more limited in scope. For example, Florida's authorization
statute would appear to provide blanket authorization for all its municipal entities. It
states:
For the purpose of rendering effective the privilege and benefits of any
amendments to the bankruptcy laws of the United States that may be enacted for
the relief of municipalities, taxing districts and political subdivisions, the state
represented by its legislative body gives its assent to, and accepts the provisions
of any such bankruptcy laws that may be enacted by the Congress of the United
States for the benefit and relief of municipalities, taxing districts and political
subdivisions and its several municipalities, taxing districts and political
subdivisions, at the discretion of the governing authorities thereof, may institute
and conduct and carry out, by any appropriate bankruptcy procedure that may
be enacted into the laws of the United States for the purpose of conferring upon
municipalities, taxing districts and political subdivisions, relief by proceedings in
bankruptcy in the federal courts.
FLA. STAT. § 218.01 (1999). However, Florida law also provides for active intervention by
the governor in case of financial emergency, which is triggered upon the occurrence of any
of several specific financial or other defaults. During the period of financial emergency,
the municipal entity may not seek bankruptcy protection without the governor's approval.
See i& § 218.503(4). The governor also has significant oversight authority over the local
entity and may appoint a financial oversight board. See id- § 218.503(3). It is unlikely that
a municipality would be a candidate for bankruptcy without already having triggered a
financial emergency. Therefore, as a practical matter, the blanket authorization provision
may never matter.
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(2) Blanket Prohibition
Like blanket authorization, blanket prohibition of all municipal
entities from filing bankruptcy has the advantages of simplicity and
definiteness. There will be no litigation over municipal access to
Chapter 9. However, this approach obviously makes unavailable
what might be a useful tool for financial crisis management. It is
quite a blunt approach, effectively predetermining that a Chapter 9
filing will never be appropriate for any municipal entity in the state.
At the least, the state would have to provide some other
mechanism for addressing municipal financial crisis. But state law
approaches may have shortcomings because of federal Constitutional
limitations on impairment of contracts. 6 Blanket prohibition is
probably too blunt and is not recommended. Only Georgia expressly
prohibits all resort to Chapter 9.7
(3) Limited NondiscretionaryAccess
A middle path between blanket authorization and blanket
prohibition would be to create categories of municipal entities that
would have varying standards for bankruptcy authorization. Some
might be granted unconditional authority to file; others would have
conditional authority for bankruptcy; and still others would be
prohibited. Given the multifarious types of municipal entities that
exist in California, it might be possible to distinguish particular types
of entities that should or should not have access to bankruptcy.
General purpose political subdivisions-cities and counties-are
distinguishable from special purpose entities-irrigation, hospital, and
pest control districts.
The statewide political and economic
ramifications of financial distress would generally be more drastic
with the former than the latter. The latter are more likely to be
smaller, with smaller budgets and fewer constituents that might be
affected by an entity's financial distress.
This "pre-defined access" approach has merit insofar as it offers
the prospect of separate, somewhat tailored solutions for different
types of municipalities. This might provide some definiteness and
predictability for particular municipal entities, financial markets, and
creditors, as compared to a wholly discretionary system. By drawing
lines ahead of time, this approach might avoid the politicization and
confusion that could occur in attempting to exercise discretionary
authority in the charged context of a particular crisis.
On the other hand, this approach may suffer the risk of rapid
obsolescence. Times change faster than statutes do, as the current

126. See supra Part I[A].
127. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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authorization provision illustrates. New types of municipal entities
may arise. Witness the Orange County Investment Pool. New types
of financing are possible. It may be too much to hope that a statute of
this type would maintain its relevance without constant revision, a
fairly unattractive prospect.
Moreover, even adopting a line drawing approach, it is not
altogether clear where to draw the lines or even what the appropriate
line drawing criteria should be. Even distinguishing general purpose
entities from special purpose districts as proposed above does not
give us clear direction as to which group-if either-should have
more ready access to Chapter 9. As discussed earlier, limiting access
for cities and counties is justified because of the statewide
implications of a filing and the necessary involvement of state officials
in structuring a comprehensive fix."2 By contrast, limiting access for
smaller special purpose entities makes sense because bankruptcy
might not be a cost effective way to resolve their fiscal woes. A pest
control district, for example, might not possess the financial, legal, or
other expertise necessary to use bankruptcy effectively, or even to
decide whether bankruptcy would be useful.'29
In addition,
municipalities of the same type may have vastly different fiscal
problems. One county, for example, may suffer from a progressively
shrinking tax base and a daunting payroll burden, while another risks
financial default because of poor investment decisions. In either case,
whether and when to allow resort to bankruptcy is difficult to decide
in the abstract.
In my research, I did not come across any state with a coherent
or comprehensive system for categorizing municipal entities for
purposes of bankruptcy access.
Some states have particular
authorizing statutes for particular types of entities, but these appear
to have been enacted on an ad hoc basis for the specific types of
municipal entities addressed, and not in any comprehensive way. For
example, Colorado has separate authorizing provisions for irrigation
and drainage districts" and special districts,"' but no statute of
general application.'32 As a result, authorization statutes for
particular entities may be scattered throughout a state's general laws.

128. See supra Part III[A].
129. See supra Part III[C].
130. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-32-102 (1999).
131. See iL § 32-1-1403.
132. The reason for this lack of a general statute in Colorado and other states may be
that before 1994 federal bankruptcy law did not require specific state authorization but
only general authorization. Many courts were willing to infer general authorization quite
readily. See cases cited supra notes 24-25. States may therefore have assumed that for
general purpose municipalities, explicit statutory authorization was unnecessary, and they
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B. A Proposal for Discretionary Access
The basic premise of my proposal is that the governor must
authorize any municipal bankruptcy filing. The governor should also
have wide latitude to attach conditions to the bankruptcy
authorization. In terms of setting conditions, the governor should
have a short menu of well-defined options at his disposal, including
the possible appointment of a trustee to manage the municipal entity
through its financial crisis.
My approach attempts to encourage and facilitate cooperation
between the state and the distressed municipality. Rather than
empowering the governor to dictate terms to a municipality in
trouble, it will encourage early communication between the two and a
negotiated resolution of any financial crisis. This section describes
the structure and scope of the discretionary system. The next section
explains the anticipated negotiation dynamics.
(1) Other State Models

Several states have similar discretionary systems. Connecticut
requires the governor's consent.133 In addition, if he consents, the
governor must report to the state treasurer and the General
Assembly to explain the basis for this decision.TM North Carolina
requires preapproval by a Local Government Commission,135 a ninemember commission that forms a division within the state treasurer's
department. The Commission comprises the state treasurer, the state
auditor, the secretary of state, the secretary of revenue, and five
appointees."'
In New Jersey, a Municigal Finance Commission must approve
both the filing of the petition and any plan of adjustment." These
provisions are part of a general state intervention scheme. Once a
municipality has been in financial default to bondholders or
noteholders for more than sixty days, the Commission may intervene
have not gotten around to amending their statutes following the 1994 bankruptcy
amendment requiring specific authorization.
133. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7-566 (1999).
134. See id. This provision was enacted in the wake of the controversy over the city of
Bridgeport's attempt to file bankruptcy over the objection of the state of Connecticut,
which claimed that Bridgeport was not authorized to file under state law. See In re City of
Bridgeport, 128 B.R. 688 (Bankr. W.D. Conn. 1991). That case arose under former
Section 109(c) of the Bankruptcy Code, which required only general state authorization to
file. See supranote 22 and accompanying text.
135. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 23-48 (1999). This provision, enacted in 1939, is a bit
outdated. It refers to creditor approval issues from a 1937 federal bankruptcy statute. See

id.
136. See id. § 159-3.
137. See NJ. STAT. § 52:27-40 (1999).
138. See id. § 52:27-42.
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to manage the financial affairs of the municipality.'

Other states

have similar comprehensive schemes for assertion of state control

over municipalities in distress. Typically the body designated by the
state to oversee or manage the municipality also has power to
authorize or even initiate a bankruptcy filing."

Pennsylvania has two separate systems for cities in distress-one

for its largest cities.. and one for smaller cities and towns. 42 The

Pennsylvania Intergovernmental Cooperation Authority is a state
agency charged with providing technical and financial assistance to
large cities in distress.4' Among other things, the Authority may issue
bonds and extend loans to the "assisted city." While this system is
quite elaborate, several details are worth noting. First, neither the

Authority nor the assisted city may file for bankruptcy as long as the
Authority has bonds outstanding." 4

Second, the governor must

approve any bankruptcy petition and the plan of adjustment, which
must be submitted for the governor's approval along with the
petition.45 For certain other municipal entities, the Department of
Internal Affairs must authorize the bankruptcy filing and approve the
plan of adjustment."4
(2) Why the Governor?

Given the need for early state involvement in municipal financial
distress situations, the governor's office is probably the best place to
begin that cooperative process. The governor is the chief executive of
the state, and his office may be best situated to bring expertise and

resources to bear on the problem and to initiate any legislative or
139. See id.§ 52:27-2. The Commission is in the Division of Local Government within
the Department of the Treasury. See id.§ 52:18A-20.
140. See Freyberg, supra note 6, at 1011.
141. The Pennsylvania Intergovernmental Cooperative Authority Act ("Act 6") was
passed in 1991. See 53 PA. STAT. §§ 12720.101-.709 (1999). It applies only for "cities of
the first class," which are those with populations exceeding one million. See id. § 101. At
the time of enactment of Act 6, Philadelphia was the only first class city in the state. See
Comment, Drew Patrick Gannon, An Analysis of Pennsylvania'sLegislative Programsfor
Financially Distressed Municipalities and the Reaction of Municipal Labor Unions, 98
DICK. L. REV. 281,292 (1994).
142. The Municipal Financial Recovery Act ("Act 47") was enacted in 1987. See id.§§
11701.101-.501. It was designed specifically to address the fiscal crises of dying steel towns
in western Pennsylvania. See Gannon, supra note 141.
143. See 53 PA. STAT. § 12720.203 (1999).
144. See id § 12720.211(A).
145. See id. § 12720.211(B), (C).
146. See id.§ 5571. Pennsylvania's model of state intervention may be particularly
instructive insofar as it has actually gotten some use. In 1992, the city of Scranton, the fifth
largest in the state, became the tenth municipality to seek refuge under Pennsylvania's
Financially Distressed Municipalities Act of 1987. See Michael deCourcy Hinds, A
Campaignto Pull ScrantonBack from Disaster,N. Y. TIMES, July 21, 1992, at A12.
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executive action that may be necessary. Placing responsibility for the
decision with the governor's office also eliminates any ambiguity
concerning who at the state level is "responsible" for authorizing the
bankruptcy filing. This has both political and practical administrative
benefits.
Having only one state official making the authorization decision
assures that that official bears the entire responsibility-that is,
receives all the credit or blame-for a good or bad decision or
strategy.'47 That political clarity will encourage the full attention of
the governor's office to the crisis. Any inclination to head for the
sidelines, to try to sidestep the likely political fallout from the crisis,
would be untenable. As the sole gatekeeper regarding any possible
bankruptcy strategy, the governor and his office would have no
choice but to become involved. This clear delineation of authority
also assures that if necessary, prompt action is possible. In case
exigent circumstances require an immediate decision concerning a
bankruptcy filing, the governor can provide the necessary
authorization. By contrast, a committee structure or legislative
approach might include more procedural baggage, which always
creates the possibility of gridlock or other delay.
In my view, affirmative authorization should always be required.
That is, the authorization statute should not permit or create the
potential for authorization by default as a result of the governor's
failure to act on an application. Among other things, SB 349
provided that any request for authorization would be considered
approved after five days unless the LABC responded otherwise.
However, that kind of "pocket approval" is exactly the sort of
mechanism that attenuates political accountability and facilitates
inaction at the state level. It leaves the municipality4 to its own
devices without any active involvement by state officials.
The point of not allowing for passive authorization is to improve
political accountability by assuring that state officials must do
something, as opposed to doing nothing, in the face of a municipal
crisis. Eliminating the possibility of passive state authorization forces
the governor to act, either by explicitly acquiescing to the request for
authorization or coming up with an alternative. It also underscores
147. My preference for the governor is not a strong one. I am more concerned that one
senior state official be responsible for exercising the discretionary power to authorize
municipal filings. The state treasurer might be an equally appropriate state officer. For
the following discussion, however, I will assume that the governor is the designated officer.
148. In addition, there is always the issue of what should be the appropriate amount of
time within which the authorizing body or person must respond before a decision is made
by default. Too long a period might hamper timely action by the distressed municipality.
Too short a period might force uninformed decisions by state officials vested with the
discretionary authority.
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the point that a municipal filing is more than simply a local matter,
and as such demands the attention and action of the governor and
other state officials.
Local officials might balk at the possibility that the governor's
inaction might delay a bankruptcy filing indefinitely. However, this
theoretical possibility should not create a basis for objection. Given
the statewide financial impact of a bankruptcy filing, no municipal
entity has any "right" to file based on any notion of home rule or
local autonomy. Once a local crisis threatens to impose costs on
other entities throughout the state, the crisis is no longer simply a
matter of local concern. Moreover, as earlier discussed, ready access
to Chapter 9 creates moral hazard problems, and uncertain access
may have some disciplining effect on local officials. 49 To the extent
that timely action by the governor may matter, it will be up to local
officials to coordinate with the governor's office, making sure that the
governor is up to speed on the issues, so that he may make timely
decisions as necessary. A municipal filing should always require some
affirmative authorization from the state.
(3) Guidelines Concerning Discretion

It may be advisable in the authorizing statute to include
guidelines for the governor's exercise of discretion. The authorizing
statute might describe factors for the governor to consider or
particular agencies to consult, depending on the type of municipal
entity. For example, the superintendent of schools would be a useful
adviser to the governor concerning the possible bankruptcy filing for
a school district. Perhaps the superintendent's concurrence in the
governor's grant of bankruptcy authorization should be required as
well."' This sort of "authority-sharing" arrangement would depend
on the particular type of municipality at issue, but in any event should
at a minimum require the governor's affirmative authorization.
Pennsylvania's authorizing statute for large cities provides an
example. It describes the process by which the governor must
exercise discretion with respect to a city contemplating a municipal
filing, including particular agencies with which the governor must
consult:
(1) When any such petition shall be submitted to the Governor for
approval, accompanied with a proposed plan of readjustment of the
debts of a city, the Governor shall make a careful and thorough
149. See supra Part III[C][1].
150. Under current law, the state-appointed administrator for a distressed school
district must approve the school district's bankruptcy filing. See CAL. EDUC. CODE §
41325 (1999). See also In re Richmond Unified School Dist., 133 B.R. 221 (Bankr. N.D.
Cal. 1991) (granting Chapter 9 debtor's motion to dismiss case after state school
superintendent appointed administrator to govern school district).
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investigation of the financial condition of such city, of its assets and
liabilities, of its sinking fund, and whether the affairs thereof are
managed in a careful, prudent and economic manner in order to
ascertain whether the presentation of such petition is justified, or
represents an unjust attempt by such city to evade payment of some
of its contractual obligations, and, if the Governor believes that
such petition should be approved, whether the plan of readjustment
submitted will be helpful to the financial condition of the city and is
feasible and, at the same time, fair and equitable to all creditors.
(2) The Governor shall also, prior to giving his approval, ascertain
the amount, if any, of the obligations of any such petitioning city
which is held by any agency or agencies of the State government as
trust funds and shall, before approving any such petition and plan
of readjustment, consult with and give every such agency an
opportunity to be heard and the privilege to examine the findings
of the Governor resulting from the investigation hereinbefore
required to be made, and shall likewise hear any other creditor of
such city, whether resident in or outside of this Commonwealth,
who shall apply therefor.
(3) The Governor, if he approves a petition, shall, before giving his
approval, require such modification in the proposed plan for
readjusting the debts as to him appear proper.
Providing guidelines would be politically useful as well, making
clear that the governor's discretion is not unfettered. On the other
hand, guidelines that are too elaborate might hobble the system,
either requiring excessive investigation by the governor before
making a decision or creating the possibility of litigation over the
governor's compliance with the guidelines. The right balance will be
important.
(4) Conditions to Filing: Financialand OperationalOversight
As the state officer empowered to authorize a municipal
bankruptcy filing, the governor should also be given the power to
attach conditions to any authorization.152 Certain conditions may be
appropriate in order to facilitate a prompt resolution of the crisis and
to mitigate the statewide impact of a filing. Several states have
enacted fairly elaborate nonbankruptcy approaches to municipal
distress, with varying degrees of oversight and control over municipal
affairs during the pendency of the crisis. For our purposes, similar
provisions could be included as "off-the-rack" options for the

151. 53 PA. STAT. § 12720.211(C) (1999).
152. For a thorough discussion of the legal basis for the state's imposition of conditions
to authorization, see AMY CHANG, MUNICIPAL BANKRUPTCY: STATE AUTHORIZATION
UNDER THE FEDERAL BANKRUPTCY CODE (Pub. Law Research Inst., Univ. of Cal.,
Hastings College of the Law, Working Paper Series (Fall 1995)), available at

www.uchastings.edu/plri/fal95tex/muniban.html.
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governor to attach as conditions to an authorization for a bankruptcy
filing. Conditions could range from the governor's prebankruptcy
approval of a proposed plan of adjustment to the governor's
appointment of a trustee to manage the municipality's affairs during
the pendency of the bankruptcy case.
In Michigan, if evidence exists of a "serious financial problem"
with a local government, the governor may appoint a "review team"
to make an assessment.153 The review team is empowered not only to
investigate the local government entity, but also, if necessary, to
negotiate a consent agreement with the local government concerning
long-range plans for financial recovery."5 If a consent agreement is
not obtained or the local government subsequently fails to comply,
then the governor may declare a financial emergency and basically
effect a takeover of the local government by an emergency financial
manager.'55 The emergency financial manager has authority to place
the local government in bankruptcy if attempts to adopt and
implement a feasible financial plan fail."
While these nonbankruptcy municipal crisis management
structures may be a bit more elaborate than California may need or
want, they provide useful models of state management from which to
borrow. Resort to these devices could be done contemporaneously
with an authorization to file bankruptcy. Without limiting the
governor's discretion to tailor conditions to particular circumstances,
I propose three basic "off-the-rack" conditions-and one variationthat might be useful.
(a) Option 1
The most aggressive condition that the governor could attach to
a bankruptcy authorization would be his appointment of a trustee to
manage the municipality's affairs, including plan formulation, for the

153. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 141.1213 (1999).
154. The agreement may provide for remedial measures considered necessary including
a long-range financial recovery plan requiring specific local actions. The agreement may
utilize state financial management and technical assistance as necessary in order to
alleviate the local financial problem. The agreement may also provide for periodic fiscal
status reports to the state treasurer. In order for the consent agreement to go into effect,
it shall be approved, by resolution, by the governing body of the local government.
Id § 141.1214.
155. The governor shall "assign the responsibility for managing the local government
financial emergency to the local emergency financial assistance loan board," which
appoints an emergency financial manager. Id § 141.1218(1).
156. This decision to file bankruptcy is subject to veto by the local emergency financial
assistance loan board. See i& § 141.1222.
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duration of the case. This condition should probably be reserved only
for serious cases of financial mismanagement. 7
The option to appoint a trustee should also be available to the
governor for the duration of any ongoing bankruptcy case, in case the
debtor fails to comply with other, earlier conditions to authorization
as described below. Because no well-defined mechanism exists to
revoke a municipal debtor's previously granted state authorization,
the state may need to resort to appointment of a trustee in order to
enforce its conditions or to dismiss a bankruptcy proceeding that the
state deems is no longer advisable.
(b) Option 1A
A less intrusive precondition to bankruptcy authorization would
be appointment of a trustee with the sole responsibility of formulating
the plan. Municipal operations would continue to be managed by
local officials, while the trustee focused on creditor negotiations.
to
Failure of local officials to cooperate with the trustee with respect
5
plan formulation might result in expanded powers for the trustee. "
(c) Option 2
This approach is less aggressive than Option 1, but would allow
the governor to monitor the case quite closely. It would require that
a plan of adjustment be submitted for the governor's approval along
with the request for bankruptcy authorization. Authorization could
then be conditioned on the filing of the governor-approved plan
either contemporaneously with the filing of the bankruptcy petition
or before some specified deadline date. The governor could
(a) reserve the right to approve any modification to the plan, and (b)
set a deadline for plan confirmation as well. A post-filing violation of
these conditions could trigger the governor's appointment of a
trustee, either to take control of the plan formulation process or to
manage the municipal debtor in general.
157. Because of the intrusiveness of this condition, perhaps its use should require the
governor to obtain the concurrence of the state treasurer or another state official.
However, the benefits of including restraints on the governor's discretion should be
carefully weighed against the possible costs of deadlock. Imagine, for example, that the
governor refuses to authorize bankruptcy without appointment of a trustee, but the state
treasurer refuses to concur in that precondition. The governor, the state treasurer, and
municipal officials would then be locked in a sort of triangular negotiation, with
possibilities for political opportunism all around.
158. Pennsylvania's approach for general municipal distress takes a similar approach.
Upon the filing of a petition, a plan coordinator is appointed to formulate the plan. See 53
PA. STAT. § 11701.262(C) (1999). The municipal debtor's failure to cooperate with the
coordinator can result in suspension of state funding to the municipality. See id. §
11701.264.
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(d) Option 3
The least intrusive approach would be for the governor to
authorize the filing, and set deadlines for the filing and confirmation
of a plan of adjustment. Failure to meet either deadline could result
in appointment of a trustee.
There is legislative precedent in California for these approaches,
and in particular for reliance on the trustee mechanism. With a series
of bills, the legislature approved the diversion of infrastructure funds
to the Orange County general fund to enable the county to fund a
bankruptcy plan. 9 With SB 1276, the legislature added a "back-up
mechanism" to "guarantee that the county will be able to prepare and
This
obtain confirmation of an acceptable plan of adjustment."'
back-up mechanism was the possible appointment of a state trustee at
the discretion of the governor if the County had not filed a plan by
January 1, 1996.61 Further, if the governor determined that timely
confirmation of a plan appeared unlikely by May 1, 1996, then
appointment of a trustee was required. 62 The trustee, if appointed,
was broadly authorized to act for the County, exercising all powers of
the board of supervisors.'63
Negotiated Resolution
The structure described above anticipates that state and local
officials will discuss possible conditions to bankruptcy authorization
prior to any formal authorization request. For example, the governor
might wish to appoint a trustee, but the municipality might oppose.
As I envision the structure, the governor could not impose a trustee
simply based on a municipality's application for authorization, but
may require it as a condition to filing. The municipality would be free
to reject the governor's bankruptcy authorization and attached
conditions by deciding not to file for bankruptcy, and the conditions
to authorization would never go into effect.
This approach gives the municipality some measure of local
sovereignty and yet encourages it to explore the bankruptcy option
with the governor. While this may ultimately result in a standoff
between the governor and the municipality, hopefully they would be
C.

159. See BALDASSARE, supra note 1, at 167-68 (describing series of bills-AB 1664, SB
863, SB 1276 and SB 727-that effected funding of Orange County plan).
160. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 30400(b).
161. See iL § 30401(a).
162. See id.
163. See id. § 30402. Because of the unusual circumstance that many creditors were also
municipal entities, the trustee vas also authorized to act on behalf of these cities, public
districts, and other governmental agencies with claims against the county, to the extent
necessary to prevent denial of confirmation of a plan of adjustment. See id. § 30405.
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able to reach a negotiated arrangement. 64' This model of negotiated
management of financial crisis follows other states' nonbankruptcy
mechanisms for resolution of municipal distress. As previously
described, Michigan's "review team" appointed by the governor is
empowered to negotiate a consent agreement with a distressed local
government concerning a recovery plan.' 6'
Pennsylvania's
Intergovernmental Cooperation Authority is authorized to negotiate
"intergovernmental cooperation agreements" with cities in need of
assistance, and general assistance may not be provided unless such an
agreement is in effect."
In contrast to these elaborate nonbankruptcy schemes, my
proposal is less formal, less elaborate, and less aggressive than these
other state systems. Because it is based on bankruptcy authorization,
the system I propose is formally triggered only by a municipal entity's
application for bankruptcy authorization and its subsequent
bankruptcy filing. By contrast, some- states' municipal distress
systems include objective triggers of financial distress that enable
early unilateral state intervention. I believe a more informal
approach is appropriate for California. States that have elaborate
state intervention provisions, like Michigan and Pennsylvania,
typically anticipated multiple municipal crises as a result of general
economic downturns and declining tax bases in their respective
regions. Without prompt and active intervention by the state,
successive municipal crises could have had severe statewide
ramifications.' 67 In California, by contrast, municipal financial distress
is quite rare, especially for general purpose municipalities.
D. The Politics of Legislating Discretionary Access

This distinction between California's situation and those of states
like Michigan and Pennsylvania suggests a final issue worth
mentioning:
the politics of legislating a discretionary access
approach. Consistent with earlier discussion on the politics of state
involvement in municipal distress, 64 the crafting of a more active role
for the state in the affairs of financially distressed municipalities may
face opposition from municipal entities and indifference from state
164. Possible legislative action would always be available to resolve a deadlock, either
by authorizing the governor to appoint a trustee regardless of any bankruptcy filing, or by
granting special authorization for the municipality to file, or something in between.
165. See supra notes 153-154 and accompanying text.
166. See 53 PA. STAT. § 12720.203(D) (1999).
167. See generally COPING WITH FISCAL DISTRESS, supra note 118 (focusing on six
distressed Pennsylvania municipalities-three cities and three boroughs-that became
financially distressed in the three years following implementation of the Financially
Distressed Municipalities Act (Act 47 of 1987), and commenting on efficacy of that act).
168. See supra Part III[B].
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officials. Even for a financially healthy municipality, its local officials
may find unappealing the possibility of an increased role for the state
in the case of its hypothetical financial distress. State officials as well
may be unenthusiastic about the prospect of early involvement in
managing local distress situations.
However, each municipality, while concerned for its own
autonomy, must also consider the consequences of autonomy for
other municipalities in the state. Because a healthy municipality may
be adversely affected by another municipal entity's financial
mismanagement or misfortunes, municipalities might favor legislating
some system of active state involvement in municipal distress.
Especially in states facing statewide economic crisis, healthy local
entities may support state intervention in the affairs of distressed
entities. A healthy entity has much to lose in that context without
state intervention to stem the crisis. State officials likewise may have
no choice in that situation but to assert an active role. Moreover, the
specter of once-pending statewide financial crisis may go a long way
toward explaining the existence of provisions for aggressive state
intervention in other states.
California currently faces no such crisis. Legislating a more
active role for the state-even the relatively minor amendment of
requiring the governor's authorization for a Chapter 9 filing-may
therefore fail to attract instant political support. Ironically, however,
the absence of any imminent financial emergency may offer an ideal
environment for careful consideration of such legislation.
Deliberation removed from the passions of an immediate crisis may
produce a better system of state authorization-one that better
accounts for statewide interests-than case-specific legislation forged
under time pressure in the face of catastrophe.
V. Some Issues Concerning the Scope and Definition of

"Municipality"

As earlier discussed, only a municipality-a "political subdivision
or public agency or instrumentality of a State"' 6 9-is eligible for
Chapter 9. In the course of discussion over California's state
authorization scheme, particular questions have been raised
concerning the scope and clarity of this federal definition, and
whether a state authorization scheme may account for such issues. In
this Part, I consider these questions.

169. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(40) (1994).
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A. A State Law Definition of "Municipality"
Noting possible ambiguity in the U.S. bankruptcy law definition,
some have suggested that a state authorization statute for Chapter 9
should include a state law definition of "municipality" or an
enumeration of entities that qualify.70 This comes in the wake of the
controversial bankruptcy court decision in Orange County finding
that OCIP was not a municipality under the federal statute and
therefore not eligible for Chapter 9."' A state law definition or list of

public entities might be useful in indicating to a bankruptcy court
what California considers a "public agency or instrumentality" of the
state. In particular, a state law provision might at the margin
encourage a bankruptcy court to construe Chapter 9 access more
liberally than it otherwise would."
This approach has some promise but also some limitations. On
the positive side, it makes sense for the state to want to broaden the
definition of "municipality" as much as possible, since the state can
always limit access through its authorizing power. A state agency
should not be denied access to Chapter 9 simply because it has a
novel purpose that may not comport with traditional municipal
functions.
On the other hand, technically, only the federal definition
matters. That definition cannot be expanded by state legislation, any
more than any federal statute is subject to modification by a state
legislature. No state can expand the availability of Chapter 9 by
redefining the term "municipality." Regardless of any state law
definition, it will ultimately always be up to a bankruptcy court to
decide whether a particular debtor qualifies under federal law. A
state law definition might be informative and persuasive to a
bankruptcy court judge, but it cannot rewrite federal law.
A list approach may be more effective. It would not redefine
terms contained in the federal statute, but would merely provide a
reference for the bankruptcy judge in her attempts to construe the
terms "political subdivision" and "public agency or instrumentality"
from federal law and decide whether a particular state-created entity
qualifies. For example, some manifestation by the state that it
considers a county-created investment pool to be a state agency or
instrumentality might be persuasive.
170. See Memorandum from Henry C. Kevane, partner, Pachulski Stang Ziehl Young
& Jones, to Randall Henry, Office of Senator Quentin L. Kopp at 3 (May 31, 1996) (on
file with the California Law Revision Commission).
171. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
172. Presumably, resort to a state law definition would be unnecessary if the point were
to narrow access to Chapter 9, since the state can do that anyway through its authorizing
power.
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This approach has limits, of course. It would be useful only when
the entity at issue has some plausible claim to being a public entity. A
private firm would not qualify, regardless of any state law spin.
B. Nonprofit Corporations
A question has been raised as to whether a nonprofit corporation
that administers government-funded programs may be eligible for
Chapter 9. '73 Given that some or all of the assets of the nonprofit are

either restricted grant funds or assets purchased with such funds, the
basic concern is that the granting government agency be able to
recover the assets, instead of having them used to satisfy the claims of
general creditors.174 The short answer to this inquiry is two-fold.
First, nonprofit corporations generally do not qualify as
municipalities, even if their sole activity is administering governmentfunded programs. Therefore, they are ineligible for Chapter 9.
Second, concerns of the granting government agencies can adequately
be addressed in Chapter 11, for which nonprofit corporations are
clearly eligible.
The basic statutory hurdle for such entities with respect to
Chapter 9 is that because they are private entities, as opposed to
government entities, they will generally fail to qualify as
municipalities. What distinguishes a public entity from a private one
is that a public entity is subject to the control of some public
authority!
A nonprofit corporation will generally fail this test.
While its grant funds may be subject to government control in the
sense that uses of the funds are typically restricted by the terms of the
applicable grants, that type of contractual restriction imposed by the
government does not change the essentially private character of the
corporation. Nonprofit corporations are ordinarily formed and
controlled by private parties, not governmental entities. Their
managers and directors are private parties. Contracting with a
government entity cannot transform the private entity into a public
one. The special protections from federal court interference that
173. See Stan Ulrich, Bankruptcy Code: Chapter 9 Issues, Staff Memorandum 97-19,
California Law Revision Commission, at 7 (March 22, 1997).
174. Telephone Interview with Colin W. Wied, Esq., former commissioner and
chairperson, California Law Revision Commission (Mar. 7,2000).
175. See In re Westport Transit District, 165 B.R. 93, 95 (D. Conn. 1994) (ultimately
dismissing petition because municipal entity was not authorized to file); In re Ellicott
School Building Authority, 150 B.R. 261,264 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1992); In re Greene County
Hospital, 59 B.R. 388, 389 (S.D. Miss. 1986) (citing Ex parte York County Natural Gas
Authority, 238 F. Supp. 964, 976 (W.D. S.C. 1965), modified, 362 F.2d 78 (4!h Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 383 U.S. 970 (1966)). In Greene County Hospital, the court found that
because a hospital was subject to control by a county board of supervisors, it qualified as a
public agency. Greene County Hospital, 59 B.R. at 390.
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Chapter 9 affords to municipal debtors are unnecessary for private
corporations, which do not raise Tenth Amendment concerns.
Moreover, the use of a nonprofit for quasi-governmental
purposes is sometimes driven by a desire to avoid certain state law
restrictions that might apply to public agencies. The only published
decision specifically addressed to this issue is In re Ellicott School
Building Authority," which involved a nonprofit corporation whose
main purpose was to engage in a lease financing arrangement for a
school building. The debtor nonprofit corporation was formed to
finance, construct, and own a school building that it would lease to
Colorado School District 22.
The debtor financed its land acquisition and construction with
two bond issues.' 8 Use of a nonprofit corporation to issue the bonds
was necessary in order to avoid state law requirements concerning
voter approval for tax increases. Voters in the school district had
earlier defeated a bond proposal that would have authorized a tax
increase to finance the new school building.' The debtor's articles of
incorporation required that the debtor's directors be residents of the
school district, but not elected officials or employees of the school
district. The apparent purpose of this latter restriction was to assure
that the nonprofit would not be considered the alter ego of the school
district, and the debt would not be considered municipal debt subject
to state law restrictions." ° Given this structuring and the point of
forming the nonprofit in the first place, it would have been ironic if
the debtor nonprofit had subsequently been permitted to claim status
as a public agency and avail itself of Chapter 9.
While nonprofit corporations will not generally be eligible for
Chapter 9, they are eligible for Chapter 11 reorganization-without
the need for any state authorization 8 -and are accorded some
advantages over their for-profit counterparts. Creditors cannot
involuntarily place a nonprofit corporate debtor into bankruptcy.'1 A
nonprofit corporation's Chapter 11 case cannot be converted to a
Chapter 7 liquidation without its consent' 8

176. See supra Part I.
177. 150 B.R. 261 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1992).
178. The bonds were secured by a mortgage on the land and improvements and an
assignment of the lease between the debtor and the school district. See i at 262.
179. See id. at 263.
180. See id. at 264.
181. See 11 U.S.C. § 109 (1994).
182. See id-§ 303(a). The Code does not specifically use the term "nonprofit." Instead,
a nonprofit corporation is "a corporation that is not a moneyed, business, or commercial
corporation." Id183. See id- § 1112(c).
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Perhaps most important for a nonprofit administering
government-funded programs, the government funds may not
necessarily be subject to creditors' claims. To the extent that the
government grants restrict the debtor's uses of grant funds, the debtor
may be deemed merely "an agent to carry out specified tasks" for the
grantor. 4 The case of Joliet-Will County" involved grants that
imposed "minute controls" on the use of government funds.1 6 The
recipient had very little discretion:
Each grant contains a budget specifying the items for which costs
chargeable to the grant may be incurred and the amount that may
be charged for each item. The grantee may not switch unused
funds between items, and although he has title to any personal
property bought with grant moneys he must reconvey to the
government, if the government tells him to, every piece of property
costing $1,000 or more. In these circumstances, the grantee's
ownership is nominal, like a trustee's.87
As such, the debtor is not a borrower from the granting agency but a
trustee for the agency's funds. The funds are not the debtor's
property and are therefore not subject to creditors' claims. Instead,
they are assets of the granting agencies, which can recover them out
of bankruptcy." s
Conclusion
I have proposed a discretionary system of state authorization
that balances (a) the state's interest in its financial health and the
financial health of its various municipalities with (b) individual
municipalities' interests in local autonomy. California's authorization
statute should place discretion with the governor to decide whether
and under what conditions a municipality may file for bankruptcy.
His discretion should not be unlimited, but should be subject to
guidelines that may vary depending on the type of municipality
involved.
By using bankruptcy authorization as a triggering mechanism for
state involvement in local financial distress, I hope to encourage early
interaction between local and state officials and ultimately a
cooperative approach to resolving local distress.

184. In re Joliet-Will County Community Action Agency, 847 F.2d 430, 432 (7th Cir.

1988).
185.
186.
187.
188.

See id.
Id.
Id.
See id.

